Ironclad, one of many types of combat Uncrewed Ground Vehicle fielded by Ukrainian forces.
Last month, Ukrainian officials announced plans to field 15,000 ground robots – Uncrewed Ground Vehicles or UGVs — in 2025. That is a huge scaling up, and for obvious reasons.
“It’s no secret that Ukraine is facing a severe shortage of personnel,” Kateryna Bondar, Fellow at Wadhwani AI Center, at the thinktank Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) told me. “This creates an urgent, existential need to substitute human roles with robotic systems.”
Ukraine has scaled up drone production at pace, going from a few thousand in 2022 to 200,000 in 2024 to 2 million last year. But putting thousands of metal boots on the ground to replace humans is a far more challenging prospect, as Bondar explains.
Army Of Machines
The figure of 15,000 combat robots came from Hlib Kanevskyi, head of the Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense quoted in Economichna Pravda. Kanevskyi says they signed contracts for $2.5 million of UGVs in the last half of 2024, in the first quarter of this year that surged to $150 million. This suggests a roughly hundred-fold increase.
There is certainly plenty of optimism about military robotics, and no shortage of Ukrainian UGV designs, with developers unveiling a new model every week or so. These are wheeled and tracked machines of various shapes and sizes, with roles from minelaying and mine clearing to logistics, casualty evacuation and direct combat either with explosive payloads or machine guns. Recent trials by the BRAVE1 defense technology incubator involved 70 different types.
But there is much less sign of these machines at the front. Out of 50 types approved for military use, only 10 to 15 are in regular service according to . Much if this is due to the practicalities, which are more challenging than with shoebox-sized FPVs.
“Imagine bringing a 1,000-kilogram machine to the front line,” says Bondar. “It’s a logistics issue. If it runs on fuel you have to transport that as well, if it runs on batteries they will be big and heavy and require generators to recharge.”
Then there is the cost. While small drones are literally expendable items costing a few hundred dollars apiece, UGVs are not so affordable.
“Even a small one with a small payload starts at around $2,000-$3,000,” says Bondar. “The more expensive ones are $10,000 and up. This is partly because they are much harder to manufacture — you cannot just make a body on a 3D printer.”
At those prices, UGVs are only worthwhile if they can do things which aerial drones cannot. And given that drones are excellent for scouting and hitting targets many miles away with precision strikes, UGVs tend to be confined to more niche roles.
Machines Saving Lives
“Logistics are an interesting use case,” says Bondar. “UGVs are now conducting way more missions and replacing people. Using a UGV removes a person from physical risk.”
Zmiy – “Snake” — is a typical logistics UGV, a remote-controlled vehicle able to carry 1,100 pounds … More
The last few miles to the front line are within the strike range of Russian FPV drones, and trucks and vans are easier to attack than dug in positions.
“Going there and coming back is a super high-risk mission,” says Bondar. “A UGV which can carry 60 kilos can resupply a troop position for four or five days. That’s very efficient.”
Casualty evacuation going the other way is equally vital, though few are willing to trust a wounded soldier to a machine which may break down on the way and evacuation by UGV is seen as a last resort.
Ukrainian news sources described a UGV evacuation last month, in which three wounded soldiers were transported more than 10 miles through an area covered by Russian mortar and artillery fire. The operation was a success, but it required more than 50 people to carry out, including the UGV operator, drone operators to track the UGVs progress, electronic warfare support and others.
This highlights another issue with UGVs: they may be uncrewed, but it takes a lot of people to operate them. And while driving up and down well-defined roads is difficult enough, it is even harder for combat robots which have to go off road. These typically require a driver plus as weapon operator to control the UGV, as well as a two-person drone team to provide aerial overwatch and guide the team on the ground. That’s four people plus a load of hardware to replace one soldier.
A Russian drone operator shares his display with a colleague operating a UGV on the ground, giving … More
An image of a Russian UGV team in action from a TV news report illustrates this problem well. The UGV is in long grass, and the operator cannot see where he is going. The drone operator shares his display, so the UGV operator gets a bird’s-eye view of his position – but the drone operator still needs the display to fly his own machine. Better software and machines which can direct themselves will greatly ease the workload.
“The future is all about autonomy and AI,” says Bondar.
Smart software would allow the UGV to navigate for itself, using imagery from an autonomous drone flying overhead. The operator then becomes a mission commander, ordering the UGV where to go, and selecting and approving targets for the weapons. But achieving this is far more difficult than autonomous flight.
“Even in civilian contexts, autonomous ground navigation remains unsolved; self-driving cars still struggle with edge cases on paved roads despite years of investment and defined traffic rules,” says Bondar.
And of course, things are much more difficult in a military context.
“The system must be able to perceive its environment in real time, make context-aware decisions, avoid obstacles, and control the vehicle’s complex mechanical systems—all under conditions of GPS denial, degraded comms, and electronic warfare,” says Bondar. “While some promising prototypes exist in research labs, widespread battlefield deployment—especially where a single human serves as a mission commander for multiple UGVs—will likely take several more years to mature, even in high-urgency environments like Ukraine.”
Robots On The Offensive
But while the software is still maturing, with plenty of human assistance the hardware can already take on carry out useful missions.
“Ukraine has already carried out their first robot-only assault,” says Bondar. “The whole thing was completely remote-controlled.”
This was a successful attack on Russian positions involving a mix of scout drones, bombers, FPVs and dozens of UGVs on the ground carried out by the 13th National Guard Brigade at the end of last year.
Bondar notes that as soon as the UGVs had done their job, soldiers moved in to secure the position. The Ukrainians call this approach “assault without assault” because the soldiers themselves are not involved in the action.
“It looks like Ukraine’s main goal in this operation was to collect experience, then create guidelines and standards in term of tactics so this knowledge can be distributed,” says Bondar. “But I’m pretty sure we will see more of those.”
Defensive operations are more straightforward. Ukraine has many robotic weapon systems and automated turrets. The simplest of them, are little more than a machine gun on a tripod with a video camera and a servo motor. Operators using these can co-ordinate with aerial scouts and FPV operators to blunt Russian attacks without anyone in the trenches.
“At this point I think they could hold a defensive position fairly well,” says Bondar.
Humanoid Warriors?
Looking forward, many companies are starting to produce humanoid robots which, in theory, could take on a role as soldiers. However, even tracked machines designed for the terrain have mobility issues.
“Our robot got stuck in the mud while performing a task and we sent another robot with a winch to rescue it,” runs a typical complaint cited in a Ukrainian report on UGV operations. “As a result, the Russians destroyed the robot with the winch.”
Mud, snow, sand and grass are frequently mentioned as major obstacles to UGVs.
‘Robot dog’ being tested in Ukraine. These have not yet found a battlefield role
Legged robots, which are supposed to provide superior mobility over all sorts of terrain are not necessarily the answer. Ukraine has deployed quadrupeds – ‘robot dogs’ – but Bondar reports the results have been poor.
“Operators complained that ploughed fields are a problem for quadrupeds,” says Bondar. “And they get stuck in the mud. And they can’t hide. At this point they are a nice toy, with no application on the front line yet.”
In principle, a humanoid robot would be far more mobile and could cross ground as easily as a human. Machines like Tesla’s much-hyped Optimus and Unitree’s Humanoid G1 could be useful – when the AI that drives them is smart enough. Elon Musk suggests that Optimus will start from around $30k and will drop in price. But flashy demonstration videos are one thing, practicality – as with the robot dots – is another.
Machines like Tesla’s Core Technology Optimus humanoid robot could in theory offer a low-cost, … More
“While in theory they offer human-like mobility and could eventually move, hide, and take cover like a soldier, their real utility will only become clear through practical battlefield testing,” says Bondar.
Battery life of a couple of hours could be more than enough for a robotic unit to carry out an assault, and take a position which could then be occupied by human back-up. This is only a small tactical step from actions from assaults with tracked UGVs, with the difference that humanoids might advance faster and enter trenches and dugouts to clear them. In theory, at least.
“Ultimately, the affordability and effectiveness of humanoid robots will depend entirely on the type of missions they’re tasked with and how reliably they can be reused,” says Bondar. “Until those use cases are tested and proven, their true value remains speculative.”
Ukraine’s 15,000 robots will be working alongside over 800,000 humans, and for the time being the machines will be in a supporting role rather than taking over combat.
“UGVs are likely to carve out an essential role in performing the most dangerous support tasks, where they can reduce risk to human soldiers without being lost in unsustainable numbers,” says Bondar.
Bondar’s CSIS paper Ukraine’s Future Vision and Current Capabilities for Waging AI-Enabled Autonomous Warfare can be read here.
The ratio of robots to humans may change rapidly in Ukraine as it has with drones. And over time AI in particular is likely to transform clumsy UGVs into more mobile, efficient fighting machines. It may not be happening yet, but removing humans from the front lines may be simply a matter of time.