Ukrainian strikes on the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade in Kursk.
Ukrainian Center for Strategic Communication capture
Four months after racing to Kursk Oblast in western Russia to meet the surprise Ukrainian invasion of that border region, the Russian navy’s battered 810th Naval Infantry Brigade is finally calling it quits—at least for a little while.
The 2,500-person brigade, one of at least two major marine units supporting Russia’s counteroffensive in Kursk, is reportedly heading from the western edge of the 250-square-mile salient to the quieter eastern edge and setting up camp in Plekhove, a village a short distance from the front line that the Ukrainians gave up in mid-December amid a costly but relentless assault by the North Korean 11th Army Corps.
“The guys from the 810th Brigade can have a smoke break, think about the eternal, collect their thoughts and prepare for future battles,” one Russian blogger mused, stressing that the redeployment to Plekhove is a temporary rotation off the front line.
It’s not a retreat, the blogger insisted. Russia’s naval infantry brigades “are the main striking fist in the liberation of the Kursk region, steel brigades, but even they need a rest.”
But it’s hard to argue that the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade and its sister unit in the Kursk counteroffensive, the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade, aren’t worn out after months of mostly failed assaults on the western edge of the salient. The 155th Naval Infantry Brigade has probably already been destroyed and rebuilt many times—and is currently undergoing its latest replenishment after reportedly losing many of its people and much of its equipment to Ukrainian mines, drones and artillery.
The 810th Naval Infantry Brigade could be in an equally dire state. The brigade may have assigned two of its 400-person battalions to a costly attack on the Ukrainian garrison in Pogrebki, in the no-man’s-land on the northwestern edge of the salient, starting in November. “It looks like last month’s two-battalion-sized assault breakthrough went nowhere and was eliminated,” noted Moklasen, an open-source intelligence analyst who closely followed the Pogrebki battle.
Adding insult to injury, the Ukrainians targeted the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade right before the purported rotation off the front line. A Christmas Day bombardment of a headquarters in the city of Lgov, just outside the Ukrainian-held salient, may have killed or wounded members of the brigade’s command staff—an attack the blogger claimed had nothing to do with the decision to pull the brigade off the front line.
A few days or weeks in Plekhove might not be terribly relaxing for the survivors of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade’s first four months in Kursk. The village is well within range of Ukrainian forces’ heavy weapons. “Plekhove, frankly speaking, is a dubious place for rest,” the blogger admitted.
That the Kremlin must now rotate at least some of its exhausted units off the Kursk front line is indicative of the slow pace and high cost of the Russian counteroffensive in the oblast. Even with a 60,000-to-20,000 manpower advantage and the help of a 12,000-strong North Korean corps, the Russians have succeeded in recapturing just a quarter of the salient. “This is quite pathetic,” mused Joni Askola, a Finnish analyst.
It’s unclear how many Russians have died or been injured in Kursk since the Ukrainians invaded in early August. It’s a bit more clear how many North Koreans have been killed and wounded. According to Ukrainian Pres. Volodymyr Zelensky, the North Korean 11th Army Corps has lost a quarter of its troops since launching its first assaults two weeks ago.
As both the Russian and North Korean armies use the same infantry-first tactics, there’s a good chance the Russians have also suffered a 25-percent casualty rate. One of the lead units for the Kursk counteroffensive, the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade’s losses might be even higher.
